University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 2 Spring 2002

Article 4

2002

The Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury
Trial: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme
Court Taketh Away
Joan E. Schaffner
George Washington University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Schaffner, Joan E. (2002) "The Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 31: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol31/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
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INTRODUCTION

The Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury has attracted the attention of the Supreme Court numerous times throughout history
and several times just within the past decade. 1 It has also received the
attention of many outstanding academics and commentators. 2 The
Seventh Amendment provides that:
1. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424
(2001) (reviewing a manufacturer's claim of trade infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition and reviewing what level of appellate review shall be used in determining if a jury award is consistent with due
process and the reexamination clause of the Seventh Amendment); City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (addressing a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon a city's denial of its development proposals and addressing whether there was a right to a jury in
§ 1983 actions); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340
(1998) (reviewing whether copyright infringement actions are afforded a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment); Hetzel v. Prince William County,
Va., 523 U.S. 208 (1998) (deciding whether a writ of mandamus violated
the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (deciding whether a New York statute empowering appellate courts to order new trials when the jury's award
"deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" violated
the Seventh Amendment); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370 (1996) (discussing whether the construction of a patent claim was
a matter of law for a judge or a matter of fact for a jury); Wooddell v. Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991) (discussing whether
the Labor Management Reporting Disclosure Act provided a right to jury);
Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (discussing whether
an employee is entitled to a jury trial when seeking backpay for a union's
alleged breach of its fiduciary duty). The Court's analysis in Teny governed
its decision in Wooddell and therefore is included in the cases decided
within the past decade.
2. The legislative history behind the Amendment has been exhaustively examined in Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment,
80 HARv. L. REv. 289 (1966), and Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973). For an understanding of the historical aspects of the Amendment see THE FEDERALIST
No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). For additional analysis of the treatment of
the Amendment, see Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 1005 (1992); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CAL.
L. REv. 1020 ( 1967); Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial lly jury and the Reform of
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In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried to a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law. 3
This amendment establishes the balance of power among federal
juries, federal trial judges, and federal appellate courts by "preserving"
the essential aspects of the right to a jury trial as it existed under the
English common law system when the Amendment was adopted. 4
In analyzing Seventh Amendment jurisprudence generally, the
Court divided its inquiry into three separate and distinct inquiries.
The first, and perhaps most commonly addressed inquiry, in light of
the multitude of new statutory causes of action, is whether the cause
of action was tried at law at the time of the founding or is analogous to
one that was tried at that time. 5 This inquiry focuses upon the nature
or character of the cause of action and first compares "'the statutory
action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior
to the merger of the courts of law and equity [and] [s]econd . . .
examine[s] the remedy sought [to] determine whether it is legal or
equitable in nature.' "6
If the action had been tried at law, the Court would move to the
second inquiry. The Court would determine "whether the particular
trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of
the common-law right as it existed in 1791." 7 If the issue falls within
this category, then the issue must fall to the jury. 8 Finally, the third
component of the inquiry involves the level of judicial review permitted once the jury has returned a verdict on this issue, including both

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. REv. 669 (1918); Charles Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923).
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); see also
United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No.
16, 750). Justice Story cavalierly stated:
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the
common law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in all),
but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of our
jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for me to expound the
grounds of this opinion, because they must be obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the law.
Id. at 750.
E.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,417 (1987) (holding that there was
a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial to determine governmental liability under the Clean Water Act).
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (quoting Tull, 481
u.s. 412).
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
/d. at 376-79.
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the proper function of the trial judge and the proper scope of appellate review. 9
The language of the Amendment bases all three inquiries upon the
historical treatment as it existed in 1791 common law England. 10 In
its analysis of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court,
predominantly through the first inquiry, carefully "preserves" the basic right to jury over the cause of action. However, at the same time,
the Court denigrates that right by finding few incidents of the jury
right fundamental to the essence of the trial by jury and allowing fairly
aggressive review of jury decisions.U This trend is highlighted by several recent decisions of the Supreme Court: Teamsters Local No. 391 v.
Terry, 12 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 13 and City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd., 14 with those of Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 15 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 16 and Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group. 17
This Article begins with a discussion of the Supreme Court cases
decided in the past decade that deal with the right to a jury trial. 18
First, the Article analyzes the Court's decisions regarding the basic
right to a jury trial in the statutory actions of Terry, Feltner, and Del
Monte Dunes. 19 Next the Article analyzes Markman, Gasperini, and
Cooper Industries, which address the essential aspects of a jury trial and
the scope of the reexamination clause in an attempt to determine
their significance and impact on the Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. 20 The Article then discusses how these decisions are indicative of a trend that is consistent with the history of the Court's
9. /d. at 384-91.
10. There are several outstanding sources for a review of historical practice in
common law England. E.g., IJ. OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANuscRIPTS AND
THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAw IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (Chapel Hill &
London, 1992); Harold Chesnin & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791,
83 YALE LJ. 999 (1974); Patrick Devlin, jury Trial of Complex Cases: English
Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 43 (1980);
Fleming, James, Jr., Right to a jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE LJ. 655
(1963); John H. Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: A
Rebuttal, 83 YALE LJ. 1620 (1974) (rebutting Chesnin's and Hazard's
piece); M.T. Van Heeke, Trial by jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C. L. REv. 157
(1953); C.C. Langdell, A Brief Survey ofEquity]urisdiction, 4 HARv. L. REv. 99
(1890); Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (1961).
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. 494 U.S. 558 (1990); see also infra Part II.A.l.
13. 523 U.S. 340 (1998); see also infra Part II.A.2, Part II.B.2.
14. 526 U.S. 687 ( 1999); see also infra Part II.A.3, Part II.B.3.
15. 517 U.S. 370 (1996); see also infra Part II.B.l.
16. 518 U.S. 415 (1996); see also infra Part II.C.l.
17. 532 U.S. 424 (2001); see also infra Part II.C.2.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part I I.A.
20. See infra Part II.B-C.
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Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. 21 The Court emphasizes the
preservation of the basic right to jury under the first inquiry, while it
de-emphasizes the essence and scope of that right under the second
and third inquiries. 22
II.

THE MOST RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON SEVENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

A.

The Basic Right to jury Trial

1.

Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry

In 1990, the Supreme Court in Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terrf 3 extensively addressed the basic right to trial by jury in an Article III
court. 24 The Court held that the Seventh Amendment entitled "an
employee who seeks relief in the form ofbackpay for a union's alleged
breach of its duty of fair representation [to] a right to trial by jury." 25
The plaintiffs were employed by McLean Trucking Company. 26 McLean and the Union were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement
that set forth the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs' employment.27 The plaintiffs, objecting to various employment practices of
McLean, as well as the Union's treatment of certain grievances filed
against McLean, filed an action in federal court alleging that McLean
had violated section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act by
breaching the collective-bargaining agreement. 28 Additionally, the
plaintiffs alleged that the Union "violated its duty of fair representation."29 The plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction and damages for lost wages and health benefits, as well as a jury trial. 30 During
litigation, McLean filed for bankruptcy and was dismissed from the
suit along with the claims for injunctive relief. 31 Thus, the remaining
claim was against the Union for payment of lost wages and health benefits. The Union brought a motion to strike plaintiffs' request for jury
on the ground that no Seventh Amendment right existed. 32
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.
23. 494 U.S. 558 (1990). The Supreme Court has since decided Wooddell v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991),
which held that Terry governed the right to jury analysis of a claim brought
under Title I of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1998), seeking injunctive
relief, lost wages and benefits, and other monetary damages. Because the
Court performed an extensive analysis in Terry rather than Wooddell, this
article discusses Terry.
24. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 565.
25. Id. at 561.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Terry, 494 U.S. at 562-63.
31. !d. at 563.
32. !d.
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The Terry Court set forth the traditional Seventh Amendment twostep inquirfl 3 to determine whether a right to jury existed for a statutory cause of action by examining "both the nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought." 34 The Court stated, "[f]irst we
compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.
Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is
legal or equitable in nature." 35 The Court continued by stating that
"[t]he second inquiry is the more important in our analysis." 36

a.

The Plurality

The Justices disagreed over the proper analogy to the breach of
duty of fair representation, arguing between an attorney malpractice
action, an action at law, and an equitable action involving a breach of
fiduciary duty claim brought by a trust beneficiary against a trustee. 37
The plurality determined that the equitable action captured "the relationship between the union and the represented employees" more
fully; however, it did not persuade the plurality to characterize the
claim as "wholly equitable." 38 Rather, because "[t]he Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather
than the character of the overall action" and the breach of duty is only
one issue to be resolved in this action, the character of the employee's
action against McLean for violation of the collective-bargaining agreement must also be considered. 39 The plurality opinion noted that this
33. !d. at 565. The majority noted that a third step, "whether 'the issues
[presented by the claim] are typical grist for the jury's judgment,"' does not
affect this analysis as it "is relevant only to the determination of 'whether
Congress has permissibly entrusted the resolution of certain disputes to an
administrative agency ... and whether jury trials would impair the functioning of the legislative scheme.'" !d. at 565 n.4 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A.
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989)). In his concurrence, Justice Brennan
noted that the historical step should comprise of only one step: characterization of the nature of the relief sought. !d. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). This would simplify the analysis
and make it "more manageable than the current test" and "more reliably
grounded in history." Id. at 578 n.7. However, the characterization of the
remedy is not always easy. For example, the circuits were horribly split on
the question of whether a party has a right to trial by jury under the copyright laws when requesting statutory damages. E.g., Cass County Music Co.
v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 638-41 (8th Cir. 1996) (reviewing the various
circuits decisions and noting the split among them). The Eighth Circuit
held that the statutory damages were "legal" in nature and that the jury
should determine the amount of the award. Id. at 643-44. The Supreme
Court ultimately resolved this issue in Feltner. See infra Part II.A.2.
34. Terry, 494 U.S. at 565.
35. !d. (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987)).
36. !d. (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,42 (1982)).
37. !d. at 567-68.
38. !d. at 568.
39. !d. at 569 (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)).
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issue was "comparable to a breach of contract claim - a legal issue"
leaving the plurality in "equipoise" to be resolved by the characterization of the remedy. 40
Turning to the request for damages for back pay and health benefits, the Court noted that because these damages were not wrongfully
withheld by the Union, but rather by McLean, the damages were not
restitution damages. 41 There was no longer any injunctive relief
sought; therefore, the damages were not equitable as "incidental to or
intertwined with injunctive relief." 42 Finally, the Court distinguished
the relief sought with the characterization of relief sought under Tide
VII, which some courts have held to be equitable, holding that the
remedy requested was legal and that a right to jury attached to "all
issues presented in [the] suit." 43
b.

The Dissent

The dissent argued that the plurality opinion created an "analytic
innovation" to expand the right to jury trial over an action that is
purely equitable. 44 However, such a trend appears consistent with
prior Supreme Court cases addressing the basic right to ajury. 45 The
dissent agreed that the breach of fiduciary duty was the closest analogous action at common law, but found it improper to separate this
issue from the contract issue and characterize them separately. 46 Further, the dissent distinguished the Beacon Theaters, 47 Dairy Queen, 48 and
Ross49 cases50 upon which the majority relied for such treatment
stating:
Although we have divided self-standing legal claims from equitable declaratory, accounting, and derivative procedures,
we have never parsed legal elements out of equitable claims
absent specific procedural justifications ... just as the plaintiff in a duty of fair representation action against his union
must show breach of the collective-bargaining agreement as
an initial matter, in an action against a trustee for failing to
pursue a claim the beneficiary must show that the claim had
some merit .... Proving the breach of the collective-bargain40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Terry, 494 U.S. at 569-70.
!d. at 570-71.
!d. at 571 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987)).
!d. at 573.
!d. at 584 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See infra Part liLA.
Terry, 494 U.S. at 585, 588 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
369 u.s. 469 (1962).
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
Terry, 494 U.S. at 590 (Kennedy,]., dissenting); see also infra Part liLA (discussing Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross).
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ing agreement is but a preliminary and indispensable step to
obtaining relief in a duty of fair representation action. 5
Justice Marshall, in response to the dissent, distinguished the nature of the two "issues" from the "examination of the nature of each
element of a typical claim" 52 by noting that the two "issues" here
would be brought as separate claims: one claim against the employer
and the other claim against the Union. 5 3 Furthermore, Justice Marshall noted that the treatment of the claims should not be determined
by whether the plaintiff could have maintained the suit against both
defendants. 54 In other words, had McLean not been dismissed, the
plaintiff would have had a right to jury over its claim against McLean
and the issues resolved by the jury would have precluded relitigation
of them by the judge in the claim against the Union. 5 5
Additionally, the dissent argued that the plurality characterized the
relief incorrectly. 56 Specifically, the dissent argued that the remedy
for a breach of duty of fair representation is designed "to make the
injured employee whole." 57 Moreover, neither exemplary nor punitive damages were available to the plaintiffs. 58 Such relief "parallels
the remedies prevailing in the courts of equity in actions against trustees for failing to pursue claims ... and differ[s] somewhat from those
available in attorney malpractice actions" brought in common law
courts that could award exemplary damages. 5 9 Justice Marshall, in response, criticized the dissent for "conflat[ing] the two parts of our
Seventh Amendment inquiry" by relying on the nature of the action to
determine the nature of the remedy. 60

2.

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.

In 1998, the Court in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 61
addressed the question of whether the Seventh Amendment provides
a right to jury trial on all issues relevant to an award of statutory damages in a copyright infringement action, including the amount itself. 62
Feltner had acquired several television stations and had licensed several television series for those stations from Columbia Pictures. 63 Felt51. Terry, 494 U.S. at 590-91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
52. /d. at 569 n.6. This question was also presented in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). See also infra Part II.B.l.
53. Terry, 494 U.S. at 569 n.6.
54. /d.
55. !d.
56. /d. at 587 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. /d.
58. /d.
59. Terry, 494 U.S. at 587-88.
60. /d. at 571 n.8.
61. 523 u.s. 340 (1998).
62. /d. at 342.
63. /d. Feltner owns Krypton International Corporation. /d.
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ner failed to pay the royalty payments and Columbia terminated the
licenses. 64 Nevertheless, Feltner continued broadcasting the shows. 65
Columbia brought suit against Feltner alleging copyright infringement and seeking various forms of relief, which included a permanent
injunction, impoundment of all program copies, actual damages, or
alternatively, statutory damages, attorney's fees and costs. 66

a.

The Ninth Circuit's Holding

The Copyright Act of 197667 allows a copyright owner '"to recover,
instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages
... in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court
considers just."'68 The trial judge denied Feltner's request for a jury
on statutory damages and the Ninth Circuit agreed. 69 The Ninth Circuit had held that under the Copyright Act of 1909, the judge was to
assess statutory damages. 70 The court then "reasoned that '[i]f Congress intended to overrule [that decision] by having the jury determine the proper award of statutory damages, it would have altered'
the language 'as the court considers just'" when it amended the Act in
1976. 71 Thus, the statute does not grant a jury tria1. 72 Furthermore,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Seventh Amendment does not
provide a right to jury for statutory damages because statutory damages are equitable in nature. 73

b.

The Supreme Court's Holding

The Supreme Court, although agreeing that there is no statutory
right to a jury, disagreed with the Ninth Circuit with respect to its
Seventh Amendment analysis. 74 The Court noted that there are close
analogues to actions seeking statutory damages for copyright infringement from 18th century England. 75 The Court followed the historical
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

75.

!d. at 342-43.
!d. at 343.
!d.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1995).
Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1995)).
!d. at 344.
!d.
!d. at 345 (quoting Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106
F.3d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1997).
Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345. Equity is defined, in part, as a "remedy recognizable by a court of equity." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999).
Feltner, 523 U.S. at 345-47. Thus, the Court held that§ 504(c) (the statutory
damages provision) violated the Seventh Amendment and is unconstitutional. !d. at 345. Nevertheless, this does not render the provision constitutionally unenforceable. Columbia Pictures v. Krypton Broad. of
Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9thCir. 2001).
Feltner, 523 U.S. at 348-49.
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development of a suit for the infringement of a property right, beginning in the mid-17th century, where "the common law recognized an
author's right to prevent the unauthorized publication of his manuscript."76 Such suits seeking damages for infringement were tried as
actions on the case in courts of law. 77 When the first English copyright statute was enacted, actions seeking damages under the statute
were again tried in courts of law. 78 Moreover, this practice was followed in this country by the common law79 and continued to be followed after the Congress passed the first copyright statute in 1790. 80
Columbia did not dispute this historical evidence, arguing instead
that statutory damages were equitable in nature. 81 The Court disagreed, explaining that monetary relief is generally legal and "an
award of statutory damages may serve purposes traditionally associated
with legal relief, such as compensation and punishment." 82 Further,
monetary relief is not deemed equitable "simply because it is 'not
fixed or readily calculable from a fixed formula' ... [as] there is historical evidence that cases involving discretionary monetary relief
were tried before juries."83 Thus, the Court held that the Seventh
Amendment applies to a copyright infringement action seeking statutory damages. 84

3.

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.

The following year, the Court again addressed the right to jury trial,
this time for a claim brought under§ 198385 in City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes. 86 In this case, Del Monte Dunes held interest in land
that it wanted to develop within the jurisdiction of the City of Monterey.87 Mter repeated proposals and subsequent rejections by the City,
Del Monte Dunes brought suit under § 1983 claiming that the City
had affected a regulatory taking "without paying compensation or providing an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss. "88 At trial,
the court submitted the question of liability under the regulatory takings claim to the jury. 89 The Court, in determining whether this was
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

/d. at 349.
/d.

/d.
/d. at 350.
/d. at 351.
Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352.
/d.
/d. at 353 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 n.7 (1987)).
/d. The second question, whether that right includes the right to have the
amount determined by the jury, is discussed below. See infra Part II.B.2.

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1995).
526 u.s. 687 (1999).
/d. at 693-94.
/d. at 694.
/d. at 707.
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proper, 90 reiterated two questions presented under the Seventh
Amendment: first, whether the claim "'was tried at law at the time of
the founding or is at least analogous to one that was,' "91 and, if so,
"whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in
1791."92 With respect to the first question, the Court explained that
the Seventh Amendment's phrase "'suits at common law' include not
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [also] suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable
rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered.' "93 The Court concluded that the claim sounded in tort, a
traditional legal claim. 94 Moreover, the monetary relief for just compensation and the unconstitutional denial of such compensation was
compensatory in nature and, thus, traditional legal relief, making the
claim a proper one for jury consideration. 95
Four Justices dissented on the grounds that the plurality "misconceives a takings claim under § 1983 and draws a false analogy between
such a claim and a tort action." 96 The dissent agreed with the City
that the proper analogy is an inverse condemnation proceeding
"given their common Fifth Amendment constitutional source and link
to the sovereign's power of eminent domain." 97 In fact, "[t]he ultimate issue is identical in both direct and inverse condemnation actions: a determination of 'the fair market value of the property
[taken] on the date it is appropriated,' as the measure of compensation required by the Fifth Amendment."98 Thus, at common law at
the time of the framing, the closest analogue to the inverse condemnation claim "was that of direct condemnation, and the right to compensation for such direct takings carried with it no right to a jury
trial." 99
90. Id. "We next address whether it was proper for the District Court to submit
the question of liability on Del Monte Dunes' regulatory takings claim to
the jury." Id.
91. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 708 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)).
92. Id. For an analysis of the second step see infra Part II.B.3.
93. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 708 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433,
447 (1830)).
94. Id. at 709 (stating that "(j]ust as common-law tort actions provide redress
for interference with protected personal or property interests, § 1983 provides relief for invasions of rights protected under federal law").
95. Id. at 709-11. Del Monte Dunes was seeking to restore what it had lost, not
what the taker had gained. Id. at 710.
96. I d. at 733 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Id. at 734.
98. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 734 (quoting Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
99. Id. at 739.
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Furthermore, the dissent argued that the analogy to tort must
fail. 100 The dissent asserted that the Supreme Court had previously
denied the right to a jury trial in direct condemnation proceedings,
which is an equally sound tort analogue. 101 Moreover, analyzing the
action as one under § 1983 is generally too sweeping. The dissent
stated that "the remedy is not damages for tortious behavior, but just
compensation for the value of the property taken." 102 The dissent further explained:
While the statute is indeed a prism through which rights
originating elsewhere may pass on their way to a federal jury
trial, trial by jury is not a uniform feature of § 1983 actions.
The statute provides not only for actions at law with damages
remedies where appropriate, but for "suit[s] in equity, or
other proper proceeding[s] for redress." Accordingly, rights
passing through the § 1983 prism may in proper cases be vindicated by injunction . . . orders of restitution . . . and by
declaratory judgments ... none of which implicate, or always
implicate, a right to jury trial.
Even if an argument for § 1983 simplicity and uniformity
were sustainable; however, it would necessarily be weaker
than the analogy with direct condemnation actions. That
analogy rests on two elements that are present in each of two
varieties of condemnation actions: a Fifth Amendment constitutional right and a remedy specifically mandated by that
same amendment. Because constitutional values are superior to statutory values, uniformity as between different applications of a given constitutional guarantee is more important
than uniformity as between different applications of a given
statute. 103
Once again the plurality held that the basic right to a jury trial attaches to the statutory cause of action. 104 Thus, in three out of three
cases, the Court held that a right to a jury attached to statutory actions.105 Moreover, in two of the cases there were strong and persuasive dissenting opinions. 106 These results are consistent with the
historical trend of an aggressive stance when interpreting the right to
jury trial for statutory claims. 107 This trend, however, reverses when
the Court is confronted with "incidents" of the right to jury. 108
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 748.
Id. at 749-50.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 751-52 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 709.
See supra notes 25, 84, 95, 97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44-60, 96-103 and accompanying text.
See infra Part liLA.
See infra Parts II.B, III. B.
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In a rather unusual move, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 109 a patent case on appeal from
the Federal Circuit. 110 The Court addressed the applicability of "a
Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury will determine the meaning of any disputed term of art about which expert testimony is offered" to "the interpretation of a so-called patent claim .... " 111 This
seemed unusual because the Supreme Court has heard relatively few
patent appeals from the Federal Circuit since the Federal Circuit was
established in 1982 to be the exclusive arbiter of patent cases. 112
There is less need for Supreme Court review of these cases because
the expertise and jurisdictional grant of the Federal Circuit to resolve
issues of patent law for the nation sets national precedent and uniformity in the creation of the patent laws.U 3 However, the Federal
Circuit was severely divided on the issue presented in Markman, 114
providing some incentive for the Supreme Court to review the decision. Because the Court ultimately sided with the majority of the Federal Circuit, it seems likely that the Court wanted to seize an
opportunity to set Seventh Amendment precedent more generally
than merely to address an issue specific to the patent law
community. 115

a.

The Lower Court Decisions

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.U 6 raised significant issues concerning the proper roles of the jury, trial judge, and Federal Circuit in
patent infringement litigation. The determination of patent infringement is a two-step inquiry. 117 First, the meaning and scope of the patent claim language as understood by "one skilled in the art" must be
determined. 118 Second, the accused product must be compared to
the properly construed claim language to determine if, in fact, the
109.
llO.
lll.
ll2.

517 U.S. 370 (1996) [hereinafter Markman 1].
!d. at 376; see also infra text accompanying notes 135-56.
Markman I, 517 U.S. at 372.
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1) (1994)); see generally
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CiRCUIT-A HISTORY

1982-1990, 11, 229 (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991).
Williams v. Dept. of the Army, 715 F.2d 1485, 1498 (1983).
See infra note 139.
See infra Part II.B.l.b.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
[hereinafter Markman III], affd, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. Pa. 1995) (en bane)
[hereinafter Markman II], affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
ll7. Markman II, 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. Pa. 1995).
ll8. !d.
ll3.
ll4.
ll5.
ll6.
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accused product "reads on," or infringes, the patent claim. 119 The
issue for the court was to decide whether the first step was a question
of fact or law, and if a question of fact, whether a Seventh Amendment
right to jury applied. 120
Herbert Markman was the inventor and owner of a patent on an
inventory control and reporting system for dry-cleaning stores that he
licensed to Positek, Inc., a dry-cleaner. 121 Markman sued Westview Instruments, Inc. and Althon Enterprises, Inc. in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania for infringement of multiple claims of his patented invention.122 Westview manufactured and sold electronic devices to the
dry-cleaning industry, including the accused product used by Althon,
a dry-cleaning establishment. 123 The accused device, an inventory
control and reporting system, records descriptions of the articles of
clothing but retains in memory only the invoice number, date, and
cash total for each customer by means of a data input device, processor, printer, and scanner. 124
In dispute at trial was the proper interpretation of the term "inventory" in the patent claim. 125 If inventory included articles of clothing
and not only cash totals, then the Westview device would not infringe.126 At trial, the jury was presented evidence concerning the
meaning of the term inventory, including: the patent specification,
claim language and prosecution history, Markman's own testimony,
the testimony of a patent expert, and the testimony of the president of
Westview. 127 At the conclusion of Markman's case-in-chief, Westview
moved for judgment as a matter of law. 128 The trial judge deferred
ruling on the motion. 129 At the close of the evidence, the court
charged the jury on infringement, instructing the jury to determine
the meaning of the claims and then to compare the claims with the
Westview device to determine whether there was infringement. 130
The jury returned a verdict of infringement on two claims. 131
119. !d.
120. Id. at 970-71.
121. Id. at 971. The patented invention is designed to solve inventory-related
problems of the dry-cleaning business: for example, the loss of clothing and
the theft of proceeds by employees. Id. at 971. To accomplish this, the
patented invention monitors and reports the "status, location and
throughput of inventory in an establishment" by means of a data input device, processor, printer, and scanner. Id. at 971-72.
122. Id. at 972.
123. Id.
124. !d.
125. Id. at 975.
126. Id. at 973.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. !d.
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The court then granted Westview's deferred motion for judgment
as a matter of law, finding that claim construction was a matter of law
for the court. 132 The court based its decision on the established notion that a "'mere dispute concerning the meaning of a term does not
itself create a genuine issue of material fact.'" 133 The court held that
"inventory" meant "articles of clothing" and, because it was undisputed that Westview's device was incapable of tracking articles of
clothing, it did not infringe Markman's patent. 134
Markman appealed the court's grant of judgment as a matter oflaw
to the Federal Circuit. 135 Markman argued that the meaning of the
claim language is a question of fact to be decided by the jury at trial,
and that the jury verdict was "supported by substantial evidence." 136
Thus, Markman asserted that the trial judge deprived him of his right
to a jury by reinterpreting the claims merely because he disagreed
with the jury's interpretation. 137 Furthermore, Markman argued that
the trial judge misinterpreted the term inventory to necessarily include articles of clothing. 138
The Federal Circuit, en bane, affirmed the district court's grant of
judgment as a matter of law, with judges Mayer and Rader concurring
in the judgment and Judge Newman dissenting. 139 The majority held
that determining the meaning of claim language is an issue of law
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and notwithstanding inconsistencies in prior Federal Circuit precedent. 140 The majority based its
decision on the "fundamental principle of American law that 'the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the court,">I 41 and
on the need for consistency in the determination of the scope of a
patentee's rights. 142 Moreover, the m~ority held that the court may
rely upon extrinsic evidence external to the patent and prosecution
history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
treatises, to determine the proper meaning of the claim language
when the court is unfamiliar with the terminology of the art. 143 This
process, however, does not involve the crediting of evidence, the making of factual findings, or the clarifying of ambiguous language; thus
132. !d.
133. Markman III, 772 F. Supp. at 1536 (quoting Becton Dickerson & Co. v. C.R.
Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
134. Markman II, 52 F.3d at 973.
135. !d.
136. !d. at 974.
137. !d. at 973-74.
138. !d. at 974.
139. !d. at 970.
140. !d.
141. !d. at 978 (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805) (Marshall, CJ.)).
142. !d.
143. !d. at 980.
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the inquiry is not an issue of fact, but rather one of law. 144 Consequently, the majority reviewed the record de novo, and affirmed the
trial court's determination that the term inventory included articles of
clothing. 145
Judge Mayer, in his concurrence, claimed that the majority 'jettisons more than two hundred years of jurisprudence, and eviscerates
the role of the jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment ... [and]
marks a sea change in the course of patent law that is nothing short of
bizarre." 146 Judge Mayer argued that while the ultimate issue of claim
scope is one of law, it is based upon "underlying factual issues." 147
Such factual issues may need to be resolved by resorting to extrinsic
evidence. 148 Judge Mayer asserted that "[i]f this information clarifies
the meaning of the claims and is uncontested, the judge may rule as a
matter of law." 149 However, if the claim scope is unclear even with
extrinsic evidence, the resulting genuine factual dispute over the
meaning of a term falls to the fact finder for resolution. 150 Moreover,
Judge Mayer argued that because an action for patent infringement
requesting damages would have been heard in the law courts of England and because the determination of the meaning of a term in the
claim language goes to a fundamental element of the substantive
claim, the jury must resolve the underlying factual dispute. 151
Judge Newman, in dissent, also stated that when the meaning of
claim terms is in dispute, the resolution is a question of fact that depends upon credibility, weight, and the probative value of conflicting
evidence. 152 This is an issue of fact for the jury, given the historical
200-year precedent of patent infringement jury trials in the United
States. 153 Moreover, Judge Newman argued that to allow an appellate
court to review de novo such a determination results in less accurate
decision making because the determination is the result of an evidentiary showing and not intellectual abstraction. 154 Judge Rader, concurring, declined to address the question of whether claim
interpretation is an issue of law or one of fact for a jury because the
record at trial lacked substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.155 Therefore, Judge Rader opined that the grant of judgment as
a matter of law was correct. 156
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 981.
Id. at 981-82.
!d. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 991.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 992.
Markman II, 52 F. 3d at 999-1000 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1009.
Id. at 998-99 (Rader, J., concurring).
Id.
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The Supreme Court Decision

In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 157 Justice Souter delivered
the court's unanimous opinion. 158 Justice Souter began by framing
the issue quite narrowly. 159 However, the holding appeared a bit
more expansive stating: "We hold that the construction of a patent,
including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court." 160
After briefly describing the nature of patent actions and the facts of
Markman, the Court launched into its Seventh Amendment analysis.161 The Court noted that modern patent infringement actions descend from "infringement actions tried at law in the 18th century, and
there is no dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a
jury." 162 Thus, as to the first inquiry, the Court held that there is
clearly a right to a jury in patent infringement actions.
( 1)

Characterizing the Issue: Construction of a Patent Claim

The second inquiry of the Court's seventh amendment jurisprudence was at issue in this case. The Court questioned "whether a particular issue occurring within a jury trial (here the construction of a
patent claim) is itself necessarily a jury issue, the guarantee being essential to preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ultimate dispute."163 The Court described this guarantee as depending upon
"whether the jury must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the 'substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.' "164 The Court
further stated that "' [ o] nly those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by
jury, are placed beyond the reach of the legislature.' "165
These guidelines have been more narrowly defined as referencing a
"distinction between substance and procedure" 166 and as "between is157. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
158. !d. at 371.
159. !d. at 372; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text (stating the issue
framed by Justice Souter).
160. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 372.
161. !d. at 376.
162. !d. at 377 (citing Bramah v. Hardcastle, 1 Carp. P.C. 168 (K.B. 1789)).
163. !d.
164. !d. (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,426 (1987) (quoting Colgrove
v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973))) (emphasis added).
165. !d. at 377-78 (quoting Tul~ 481 U.S. at 426; Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372, 392 (1943)); see also Bait. & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S.
654, 657 (1935).
166. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 378 (citing Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390-91; Balt. &
Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 657; Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920);
Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1887)). But see Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988).

242

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 31

sues of fact and law. " 167 Interestingly, the Court did not look to these
traditional distinctions to decide this issue but rather stated that the:
[S]ounder course, when available, is to classifY a mongrel
practice (like construing a term of art following receipt of
evidence) by using the historical method, much as we do in
characterizing the suits and actions within which they arise.
Where there is no exact antecedent, the best hope lies in
comparing the modern practice to earlier ones whose allocation to court or jury we do know[,] seeking the best analogy
we can draw between an old and the new~ 68
To characterize the historical analogue approach as more soundespecially when, as here, "the old practice provides no clear answer" 169
-is peculiar given the Court's difficulties in the past in reconstructing
accurately an appropriate analogue to the cause of action. 170 Reconstructing the treatment of specific issues within the cause of action as
it existed in 1791 England was more difficult for the Court because
the Court attempted to determine the closest 18th century analogue
of modern claim construction even though claims were not a part of
patent practice at that time, but became statutorily recognized in the
United States in 1836. 171
Admittedly, drawing lines between substance and procedure or fact
and law are also highly problematic and unpredictable. 172 Neverthe167. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 378 (citing Balt. & Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 657; Ex
parte Peterson, 253 U.S. at 310; Walker, 165 U.S. at 597). But see PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982)).
168. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 378 (citations omitted).
169. !d. at 377.
170. E.g., Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 566-69 (1990); Tull v. United States,
481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-97 (1974).
171. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 379.
172. For problems inherent in distinguishing procedure from substance see
CHARLES F. CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE § 191 (1911) ("The distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory."); Walter
Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE LJ.
333, 343, 352, 356 (1933) (explaining that the line between "substance"
and "procedure" does not exist in a vacuum but rather must be drawn to
better carry out the underlying purpose of making the distinction). The
category in which to place statutes of limitations provides an excellent example of this quandary. The Court, in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717
(1988), explained that such statutes can have different characterizations
depending upon the context. Id. at 726. For example, for choice of law
purposes, statutes of limitations are "procedural" and the forum state may
apply its own statute of limitations even if applying another state's "substantive" law. !d. at 727. However, for Erie purposes, the statute of limitations is
considered "substantive." Id. The "substance-procedure" dichotomy is a
function of the purpose of the context in which the characterization is
made. !d. For choice of law purposes, the characterization is made to "delimit spheres of state legislative competence," whereas for Erie purposes, the
characterization made is to establish uniformity between state and federal
fora. Id. at 727. Thus, any given rule or law may be "procedural" in one
context yet "substantive" in another. Id. For problems inherent in distin-
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less, they have been relied upon over the years and provide useful
tools for analyzing the rationale behind the allocation of a particular
issue to the jury or judge. 173 Moreover, the distinction between fact
and law is crucial to determining the standard of appellate review as
well. 174 Blindly searching the historical cases for an analogous issue
that was perchance submitted to a ~ury during the infant stages of jury
patent practice in the late 1 700s, 1 5 combined with the documented
uncertainty of practitioners at that time, 176 merely reflects the "manufacture of a historical fiction." 177
The Markman Court proceeded to wade through numerous old
cases, scholarly articles, and treatises in an attempt to determine

173.

174.
175.
176.
177.

guishing questions of fact from those of law see Baumgartner v. United States,
322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944) (noting the difficult nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law); Martin Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A
Unified View of the Scope of Review, The judge/jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993 (1986); James Thayer, "Law and Fact" in jury
Trials, 4 HARv. L. REv. 141 (1890); Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil jury Trial
and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1867 (1966).
For example, in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982), the Court
addressed the distinction between questions of law and fact in the context
of a Title VII employment discrimination action. Id. at 287-88. The question was "whether the differential impact of the seniority system" of an employer "reflected an intent to discriminate on account of race" in violation
of Title VII was a pure question of fact, subject to a clearly-erroneous standard of review rather than a question of law or a mixed question of law and
fact. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) establishes the standards of
review as a function of the nature of the issue, but provides no guidance
with respect to distinguishing questions of law from questions of fact. I d. at
288. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). The Court relied on precedent that had
held that in other contexts, questions of intent had always been deemed a
matter of pure fact. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288 (relying on Dayton
Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534 (1979) (holding that the intent
to discriminate is a factual finding); Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960) (holding that the intent of the donor to establish a "gift" under the
tax code is a factual finding)); and United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S.
338, 341 (1949) (holding that intent to restrain trade under anti-trust laws
is a factual finding)). The Pullman-Standard Court distinguished a finding
of intent, which is factual, from the use of evidence to support such a finding based upon the consequences of the defendant's actions. I d. at 288-89.
For example, the substantive law may allow the introduction of discriminatory impact to help establish actual "intent," but the law is not satisfied
based upon "a legal presumption ... drawn from a factual showing of something less than actual motive." Id. at 289-90. Courts have relied upon legal
presumptions over the years as these presumptions provide useful tools for
analyzing the rationale behind the allocation of a particular issue to the
jury or judge. See generally Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985);
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 369-70 (1982); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979).
Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287-88.
Markman I, 517 U.S. at 380.
Id. at 380-81.
Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 578 n.7 (1990) (Brennan,]., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).

244

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 31

whether juries routinely decided the closest analogue to claim construction: specification construction. 178 The Court distinguished the
role that the specification played historically from the role the claims
play today, relying heavily upon the general proposition that judges
customarily interpreted written documents. 179 Accordingly, the Court
found no persuasive authority indicating more than a possibility that
juries historically interpreted terms of art in a specification. 18° Consequently, the jury guarantee of the Seventh Amendment did not encompass the jury's construction of the claim.
The Court next turned to other indicators in order to allocate the
issue between judge and jury. 181 These indicators included "existing
precedent and consider both the relative interpretative skills of judges
and juries and the statutory policies ... furthered by the allocation,"
specifically the need for uniformity in the construction of patent documents.182 These indicators do not involve the Court's Seventh
Amendment precedent because the Court had already determined,
based solely upon its historical analogue analysis, that there was insufficient evidence of common law practice to invoke a constitutional
right to have a jury decide this issue. 183
Ultimately, the Court held that the issue would be determined by a
judge. 184 The Court found that although precedent provided no certain answer, judges are better suited to construct written documents,
even when credibility determinations are at issue. 185 This opinion was
based upon the Court's expectation that:
[A]ny credibility determinations will be subsumed within the
necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be
defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a
whole. Thus, in these cases a jury's capabilities to evaluate
demeanor, to sense the "mainsprings of human conduct," or
to reflect community standards, are much less significant
than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to
the overall structure of the patent. 186
The importance of uniformity in patent construction is another
ground for allocating the determination to the judge. 187 Uniformity
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Markman I, 517 U.S. at 378-80.
!d. at 381-83.
!d. at 384.
!d.
!d. at 384, 390-91.
!d. at 383-84.
!d.
!d. at 388.
!d. at 389-90 (citations omitted).
!d. at 390.
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is essential in providing the public with clearly defined limits of the
patentee's rights. 188
(2)

Unresolved Issues

Perhaps the most telling aspect of the Court's decision lies in the
findings the Court deliberately chose not to make. Several times
throughout the opinion, Justice S~mter expressly stated issues that
might be important but were not decided in this case. 189 First, the
Court noted that the "formulations of the historical test do not deal
with the possibility of conflict between actual English common law
practice and American assumptions about what that practice was, or
between English and American practices at the relevant time." 190
Next, relying fairly heavily on the general practice of judges construing terms in a written document, the Court explained that it need not
consider "whether [the] conclusion that the Seventh Amendment
does not require terms of art in patent claims to be submitted to the
jury supports a similar result in other types of cases." 191 Finally, the
Court noted that:
Because we conclude that our precedent supports classifying
the question as one for the court, we need not decide either
the extent to which the Seventh Amendment can be said to
crystallize a law/fact distinction, 192 or whether post-1791 precedent classifying an issue as one of fact would trigger the
protections of the Seventh Amendment if (unlike this case)
there were no more specific reason for decision. 193
188. Id. The Court noted that while "issue preclusion could not be asserted
against new and independent infringement defendants ... treating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee)
intrajurisdictional certainty through application of stare decisis on those
questions not yet subject to inteijurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court." Id. at 391 (first emphasis added) (alteration
in original).
189. Id. at 376 n.3, 383 n.9, 384 n.lO.
190. Id. at 376 n.3. Although an inquiry of American interpretation of English
common law may affect Seventh Amendment analysis, the question of how
American practices differ from English practice should not be a concern
because the language of the Seventh Amendment was based upon English
common law practices. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.
Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
191. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 383 n.9. The Court came to this conclusion, despite
an observation of a late 18th century historian that "interpretation by local
usage for example (today the plainest case of legitimate deviation from the
normal standard) was still but making its way." Id. at 383.
192. Id. at 384 n.lO. This comment is startling because perhaps the most accepted role of the jury is to be the fact-finder in a case to which the right to
jury attaches. See infra Part III.B.l (discussing precedent supporting the
fundamental notion of the jury as fact-finder).
193. Markman I, 517 U.S. at 384 n.l 0 (citations omitted). This comment reflects
yet another interesting point. Although English common law practices
would not have provided for a jury right, American practice since 1791, may
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Interestingly, the following year, Warnerfenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. 194 was accepted by the Court on appeal from the Federal
Circuit. 195 The primary issue on appeal concerned the proper scope
of the "doctrine of equivalents," that is, a judicially created doctrine
which allows a finding of infringement when there are "insubstantial
differences" between the patent and the allegedly infringing product.196 Related to this issue was the issue of whether the scope of the
doctrine in a given case was for the judge or jury to decide. 197 The
Federal Circuit had determined that it was an issue for the jury. 198
The Supreme Court declined to address the issue, as it was not necessary to its decision. 199 In this manner, the Court left the issue as one
for the jury, pursuant to the Federal Circuit decision, but expressly
stated that it was not deciding that it would side with the Federal Circuit if it was presented with the issue. 200

2.

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.

Recall that in Feltner, 201 the Court held that a right to jury attached
to a copyright infringement claim seeking statutory damages. 202 Also

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

invoke a right to jury under the Seventh Amendment. On the other hand,
the Court, at least on one occasion, has essentially allowed entrenched federal precedent that established a procedure detracting from the right to
jury based upon a misunderstanding or ignorance of the English common
law, to remain intact even after recognizing the error made. In Dimick v.
Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 483 (1935), Justice Sutherland noted that Justice
Story, in 1822, had cited no authority whatever for the conclusion that the
Court had power to grant a new trial unless the plaintiff were willing to
remit a portion of its award. /d. He remarked that:
[T] he sole support for the decisions of this court and that ofjustice
Story, so far as they are pertinent to cases like that now in hand,
must rest upon the practice of some of the English judges-a practice which has been condemned as opposed to the principles of the
common law by every reasoned English decision ... which we have
been able to find.
/d. at 484. He further stated that if the question of remittitur was to be
taken up again, the decision might well be decided differently. !d. However, because the doctrine "has been accepted as the law for more than a
hundred years and uniformly applied in the federal courts ... [it] would
not be ... disturbed." /d. at 484-85. Nevertheless, the Dimick Court refused
to find additur constitutional by extending "doubtful precedent . . . by
mere analogy to a different case if the result will be to weaken or subvert
what it conceives to be a principle of the fundamental law of the land." /d.
at 485.
520 U.S. 17 (1997).
See id.
See id. at 21, 39.
See id. at 38.
Warner:Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en bane).
Warnerfenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39.
!d. at 38-39.
523 U.S. 340 (1998); see also supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.A.2.b.
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in question was whether Feltner had the right to have the jury assess
the amount of statutory damages in an action historically brought in a
court of law. 203 The Court concluded that a right did exist, relying on
a long history that "the jury are judges of the damages" 204 and that
this was consistent practice in copyright cases as well. 205
Columbia argued that the Court's prior decision in Tull demonstrated that a jury determination of damages was not necessary to uphold "'the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.' " 206 In
Tull, the Court "held that the Seventh Amendment grants a right to a
jury trial on all issues relating to liability for civil penalties under the
Clean Water Act, but then went on to decide that Congress could constitutionally authorize trial judges to assess the amount of the civil
penalties." 207 However, the Court in Feltner distinguished Tull. 208 In
Tull, there was no historical evidence that a jury must assess the
amount of civil penalties to be paid to the government. 209 Additionally, awarding such penalties was more analogous to sentencing in a
criminal proceeding, a decision made by a judge. 210 Here, however,
"there is no similar analogy, and there is clear and direct historical
evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases,
set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff." 211

3.

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey, Ltd.

The Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey, Ltd., 212
after finding that Del Monte had a right to a jury trial generally, also
had to determine whether the particular issues of liability were proper
for jury determination. 213 The Court, using the historical method,
found that the determination of liability in a tort action for monetary
damages was most often decided by a jury rather than ajudge. 214 Nevertheless, the Court explained that neither the historical method, nor
existing precedent established a definitive answer and, thus, turned to
considerations of process and function. 215 However, unlike the result
in Markman, 216 the Del Monte Dunes Court held that the questions
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342.

Id. at 353.
Id. at 354.
Id. (quoting Colgrave v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973)).
Id.
Id. at 355.
Id.
Id.
Id.
526 u.s. 687 (1999).
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id. at 718-20.
See supra notes 178-200 and accompanying text; see also Markman I, 517 U.S.
370, 391 (1996) (holding that patent claim construction is an issue for the
judge).
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presented were predominantly factual issues and were therefore
proper for jury consideration. 217
The Court then divided the liability issue into two questions. 218
First, on the question of eminent domain, the Court held that the
conclusion that a landowner had been deprived of "all economically
viable use of his property" is a factual determination to be reserved for
the jury. 219 The Court arrived at this holding because regulatory takings cases often involve an assessment of a particular set of facts in
light of the economic impact and purposes of the government's actions.220 Under the Seventh Amendment, a jury is the final arbiter of
the ultimate dispute in eminent domain actions because of the casespecific nature of the facts and the necessity to make specific inquiries
in order to ensure just compensation to the landowner. 221
The resolution of the second question regarding "whether a landuse decision substantially advances legitimate public interests within
the meaning of [the Supreme Court's] regulatory takings doctrine"
was less clear to the Court. 222 This question was more "difficult," the
Court opined, because the question "mixed" both factual and legal
components. 223 However, the trial court limited this "mixed" question to a factual determination by asking the jury "whether, [considering all of the circumstances], the city's decision to reject a particular
development plan bore a reasonable relationship to its proffered justifications."224 The Supreme Court upheld the submission of this question to the jury because the question was "narrow [and] factbound."225
The Court determined that while there.was no constitutional right to
a jury trial in eminent domain actions, 226 the jury was the better deliberator of fact-based questions in those actions. 227 Recall that in
Markman, 228 the Court refrained from deciding whether the Seventh
Amendment crystallized a law/fact distinction. 229 It appears that once
the historical inquiry fails to show that a jury must determine the issue, the Court finds there is no constitutional right to jury and turns
instead to functional considerations in order to allocate the decision,
although the decision does not rise to a constitutional right.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 720-21.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 720.
/d. at 720-21 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
/d. at 721.

Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 711.
/d. at 720.

517 u.s. 370 (1996).
/d. at 378; see also supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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As in Markman, the Del Monte Dunes Court circumscribed its decision, noting several limitations on its holding. 230 The Court stated
that it was not addressing the jury's role in an ordinary inverse condemnation suit, in a temporary regulatory takings claim, nor in deciding whether a zoning decision substantially advances legitimate
governmental interests. 231 Here, the narrow questions disputed by
the parties, and properly submitted to the jury, were "whether the government had denied a constitutional right in acting outside the
bounds of its authority and, if so, the extent of any resulting
damages. "232
Markman, Feltner, and Del Monte Dunes demonstrate the Court's reluctance to find a Seventh Amendment right to have a jury decide
specific issues or incidents of the cause of action to which a jury right
attaches. 233 In two of the three cases, a Seventh Amendment right did
not attach. 234 This reluctance is further demonstrated by the Court's
Reexamination Clause precedent, where the Court allows rather vigorous review of jury decisions. 235
C.

The Reexamination Clause

1.

Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.

Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 236 the second decision of the
Supreme Court's 1996 term dealing with the right to trial by jury, 237
involved interpretation of the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh
Amendment: the scope of review of factual issues tried to ajury. 238 In
Gasperini, a journalist brought a diversity suit seeking damages for loss
of 300 photographic transparencies under New York state law. 239 New
York state law empowered appellate courts to review the amount
awarded by juries "and to order new trials when the jury's award 'deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation."' 240
This standard was designed by the state to influence the outcome of a
jury's award of damages by tightening the range of tolerable
awards. 241 This conflicted with the more traditional standard, applied
in New York prior to 1986 as well as in federal courts, under which
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721-22.
!d.
Id. at 722.
See supra Part II.B.1-3.
See supra notes 160, 226-27 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.C.
518 u.s. 415 (1996).
!d. at 418. See also generally Markman I, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Markman /was
the first decision dealing with a right to jury decided during the 1996 term.
!d.
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418.
ld. at 419.
!d. at 418 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)).
Id. at 419.

250

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 31

trial judges "would not disturb an award unless the amount was so
exorbitant that it 'shocked the conscience of the court.' "242 Ordinarily, "appellate judges ... deferred to the trial court'sjudgment," overturning the judge's decision only upon a finding of abuse of
discretion. 243
The application of the New York standard involves two separate inquiries: first, whether the state law should govern in accordance with
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 244 and, if so, if application of the standard would violate the Seventh Amendment right to jury that applies
to all federal court cases. 245 The Court recognized that the state law
involved both substantive and procedural issues: controlling the
amount that a plaintiff can be awarded (substantive); and assigning
the decision-making authority to the state appellate courts (procedural).246 The procedural component of this law would be contrary to
federal allocation of trial and appellate court functions, "an allocation
weighted by the Seventh Amendment." 247
The Court analogized the standard imposed by the state law to a
state statutory cap on damages, which all parties agreed would supply
substantive law for Eriepurposes. 248 The Court noted that while it had
not addressed the issue, the "courts of appeal have held that district
court application of state statutory caps in diversity cases, post-verdict,
does not violate the Seventh Amendment." 249 The only difference between the two is that the cap established here is set by case law rather
than statute and, thus, is manifestly substantive such that the "twin
aims of the Erie rule" are implicated. 250
But does application of the state law violate the Seventh Amendment by shifting the fact-finding responsibility from the jury to the
appellate court? The Court compared its decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative, /nc. 251 to the situation at hand, noting that
the appellate court failed to account for an" 'essential characteristic of
the [federal court] system.' "252 In Byrd, the Court explained that
countervailing federal interests must be balanced against the state in242. /d. at 422 (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003,
1012-13 (2d Cir. 1995)).
243. /d.
244. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426.
245. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426.
246. /d.
247. /d.
248. /d. at 428.
249. /d. at 429 n.9 (citing Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1161-65 (3d Cir.
1989); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989)).
250. See id. at 428 (stating that "the twin aims of the Erie rule [are] discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws").
251. 356 u.s. 525 (1958).
252. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431 (quoting Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537).
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terests in applying its laws. 253 Based upon this balancing, the Byrd
Court determined that although the state court denied the parties a
jury determination of the factual issue involving the "sameness of the
work of plaintiff and defendant's own employees," 254 the distribution
of "functions between judge and jury ... under the influence - if not
the command - of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of
disputed questions of fact to the jury." 255 Thus, the Court held that
federal law would control in light of the strong federal interest
demonstrated by the "trial by jury" clause. 256 In Gasperini, a similar
issue was raised, but it involved the Reexamination Clause. 257
The Gasperini Court did not expressly decide the scope of the Seventh Amendment. 258 Rather, the Court reviewed prior case precedent, noting that several changes in appellate review standards since
common law England 1791 have been accepted by the courts. 259 For
example, although once deemed incompatible with the Seventh
Amendment, appellate review of a federal trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a jury's verdict as excessive is now allowed by circuit
courts under an abuse of discretion standard. 260 The Court noted
that it approved of these decisions because such control is "necessary
and proper to the fair administration of justice." 261 The determination of whether an upper limit "has been surpassed is not a question
of fact with respect to which reasonable men may differ, but a question of law" and thus reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment. 262
However, the majority was unwilling to go so far as to disrupt the
allocation of power between the trial and appellate judges by allowing
the appellate court to apply the "deviates materially" standard as dictated by the state law, instead of an "abuse of discretion" standard. 263
Instead, the Court held that the district judge should determine
whether the jury's verdict is within the confines set by the state law,
subject to review by the appeals court under an abuse of discretion
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See id. at 431-32 (citing Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38).
Id. at 432 n.13 (discussing Byrd).
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537 (citingJacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942)).
See id. at 538; see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432.
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 436 n.20.
Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 435.
Id. (citing Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir.
1961)). The Court noted that this alteration to the 1791 practice at common law is consistent with other changes made to common law practice
over time, such as the current six-member jury, new trials restricted to determination of damages, motions for judgment as a matter of law determined after a jury's verdict, and issue preclusion without mutuality of
parties. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436 n.20.
263. Id. at 438-39.
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standard. 264 In this manner, the state and federal interests are
preserved.
This result potentially violates the Seventh Amendment in two ways.
First, it allows appellate review of a trial court's refusal to set aside a
jury's verdict using an abuse of discretion standard. 265 Second, the
result allows the trial judge to review the jury findings under a "deviates materially" standard. 266
With respect to the first possible violation, Justice Scalia argued in
his dissenting opinion that under common law, appeals courts could
not review trial courts' refusals to set aside a jury verdict. 267 "[I] t is
not possible to review such a claim without engaging in a 'reexamin [ation]' of the 'facts tried by the jury, "' 268 Justice Scalia argued.
Scalia noted that granting a new trial under this state law requires a
two-step process. 269 The reviewing court must: (1) "determine the
range it regards as reasonable" and (2) "determine whether the particular jury award deviates materially from that range." 270
The first step in this process requires the reviewing court to reexamine facts decided by the jury, namely the amount of damages based on
the evidence presented. 271 Scalia noted that:
[T]he sort of "legal error" involved here is the imposition of
legal consequences (in this case, damages) in light of facts
that, under the law, may not warrant them. To suggest that
every fact may be reviewed, because what may ensue from an
erroneous factual determination is a "legal erro.r," is to destroy the notion that there is a factfinding function reserved
to the jury. 272
This is precisely that to which the Anti-Federalists objected. As Justice Story explained in 1812: "[O]ne of the most powerful objections
urged against [the Constitution prior to adoption] was that [the authority granted to the court] ... would enable that court, with or
without a new jury, to reexamine the whole facts, which had been settled by a previous jury." 273 Thus, the appellate court was limited to
procedures available under the common law for reexamination of
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 438.
I d. at 448-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 450.
Id. at 461.
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 461 (quoting Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref.
Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1934)).
Id. at 449.
ld. (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1013
(2d Cir. 1995)).
Id. at 450; see also Metro. R.R. Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 574 (1887) (holding that the issue of excessive damages is a question of fact).
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 464 n.10.
United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No.
16,750).
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facts. 274 The common law allowed review only on writ of error regarding questions of law. 275
With respect to the second possible violation, the majority did not
independently decide whether review by the trial judge of the jury's
verdict under a "deviates materially" standard was available at common law, and thus, compatible with the Seventh Amendment. 276 Instead, the majority relied on two federal circuit court opinions for the
proposition that application of a prescribed statutory cap on damages
to limit a jury award is not violative of the Seventh Amendment, without discussing the differences between a statutorily defined ca~ and a
cap defined as a function of the standard of judicial review. 27
In Davis v. Omitowoju, 278 the Third Circuit analyzed the Seventh
Amendment constraints governing the reduction of a jury verdict
based upon a state statute setting an upper limit of $250,000 for damages in medical malpractice cases. 279 The plaintiff argued that the
judicial reduction of the jury verdict to the legislative limit violated the
Reexamination Clause. 280 The court, noting the paucity of precedent
to govern this issue, discussed two relevant Supreme Court cases, Dimick v. Schiedt2 81 and Tull v. United States, 282 although neither case was
dispositive of the issue. 283 The court examined the holding in Tull,
which asserted that a civil penalty does not need to be decided by a
jury. 284 It then distinguished this holding with the issue presented in
Davis: whether, once a remedy determination has been submitted to a
jury, the jury's remedial authority can be limited by legislation. 285
The Davis court based its holding that legislation may limit a jury's
determination, after the fact, upon two different rationales. First, the
court explained that, while the jury is a fact-finder and a court may
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

279.
280.
281.

282.
283.
284.
285.

Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 452 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
!d.
See id. at 449-50.
!d. at 429 n.9, 433 (relying on the Third and Fourth Circuits).
883 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1989). The Fourth Circuit analysis in Bayd v. Butala,
877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989) held that the reduction of a jury verdict
to the legislative cap governing in malpractice actions is a matter of law and
thus does not violate the Seventh Amendment. The holding was quite abbreviated as compared to that of the Third Circuit. Id.
Davis, 883 F.2d at 1157.
!d.
293 U.S. 474 (1935) (holding that the practice of additur violated the Seventh Amendment, but upholding prior federal court precedent allowing
remittitur despite the fact that this practice was disfavored by the English
common law). Consistent with the notion that a remittitur was disfavored
by the common law, the Court held that when imposing a remitittur, a
court must allow the party the option of a new trial under Seventh Amendment principles. Kennon v. Gilmore, 131 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1889), discussed in
Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998).
481 U.S. 412 (1987).
Davis, 883 F.2d at 1159-60.
ld. at ll60.
!d.
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not reexamine the facts decided by a jury, the legislative limit established by statute is a matter of law. 286 If the legislature may abolish a
cause of action altogether, it certainly has the power to limit its damages. 287 Thus, a reduction of the jury award to the legislative limit is
merely conforming the verdict to the substantive law of the state. 288
The second rationale was based on a separation of powers argument and the underlying concern of judicial bias and tyranny that the
Framers sought to avoid when establishing the Seventh Amendment.289 The court noted that the Reexamination Clause expressly
limits the reexamination of facts tried by a jury by any court, stating
that it understood the language of the Seventh Amendment to guarantee the "integrity of the judicial process" and to act as a check on
the trial judge's powers. 290
In Davis, the district court judge did not reduce the jury's damage
verdict because of a reexamination of the verdict. 291 Instead, the
judge reduced the verdict to comply with legislation. 292 The court did
not read the second clause as a limitation on the exercise of legislative
authority and, hence, found that the Seventh Amendment was not violated by the reduction of the verdict. 293 In fact, the court noted that,
had the jury been instructed as to the statutory cap, a Seventh Amendment issue would not have arisen. 294
Finally, the court reviewed several historical authorities in order to
analyze the Framers' intent in drafting the second clause. 295 Each authority supported the proposition that the Framers were concerned
with judicial bias and corruption, and designed the second clause to
protect against an abuse of judicial power, not legislative power. 296
286. !d. at 1161-62.
287. !d. at 1161 (discussing Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989)
and Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (D. Md.
1989)).
288. See id. at 1162.
289. Davis, 883 F.2d at 1164.
290. !d. at 1161-62. The court opined that, while the legislature is not completely free from Seventh Amendment restrictions, the second clause "does
not restrict the power of the legislature as it was exercised in enacting the
malpractice damage cap at issue .... " !d. at 1162 n.ll.
291. !d. at 1162.
292. !d.
293. !d.
294. Davis, 883 F.2d at 1163.
295. !d. at 1163-65.
296. fd. Among the authorities cited were: BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAw, 689-90 (B. Gavit ed., 1941); HENRY HALLAM, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 139 (1847); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 563 (Alexander
Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961); Henderson, supra note 2, at 293; Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 5 KuRLAND &
LERNER, THE FouNDER's CoNSTITUTION 364 (1986); JoHN PHILLIP REID,
CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REvoLuTioN, THE AuTHORITY
OF RIGHTS 51 (1986).
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However, the Davis court's second rationale fails in the case of Gasperini, which involved a legislative grant of authority to the courts to
establish the statutory cap based upon a "deviates materially" standard.297 In Gasperini, the district court judge did reduce the jury's
damage verdict by an act of reexamination, followed by an independent finding of a verdict for a different amount. 298

2.

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.

The most recent Supreme Court decision to address the scope of
the reexamination of a civil jury decision is Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 299 In Cooper, the plaintiff asserted tradedress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising claims,
and requested punitive damages. 300 The jury returned its verdict,
awarding $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. 301 The trial court rejected constitutional arguments
that the punitive damages were "grossly excessive," and the defendant
appealed. 302 The appellate court affirmed the punitive damage
award, finding that the trial court "did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the amount of punitive damages." 303
At the Supreme Court level, the Court was asked to decide whether
the appellate court used the correct standard of review. 304 The Court
held that "the constitutional issue merits de novo review." 305 Such review does not implicate the Seventh Amendment because "the level of
punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury," 306 but is
rather "a constitutional standard [applied] to the facts of a particular
case." 307 The Court noted that its decision in Gasperini, which held
that the appropriate appellate standard of review was abuse of discretion, was consistent, as that case involved the review of compensatory
damages - not punitive damages. 308 Furthermore, although the
amount of punitive damages is generally left to the discretion of the
jury, such precedent does not mean "that the amount of punitive
297. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996).
298. See id. at 420. Justice Scalia expressly stated that he did not consider the
reexamination issue because he rejected the decision on other grounds,
namely that altering the trial judge review standard to "deviates materially"
so disrupts the federal judgejury relationship that the state law should not
apply. Id. at 463 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299. 532 u.s. 424 (2001).
300. See id. at 428.
301. Id. at 429.
302. ld.
303. Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437.
307. Id. at 435 (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37
( 1998)).
308. See id. at 437.
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damages imposed by the jury is itself a 'fact' within the meaning of the
Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause." 309
The Court again imposed certain limits on its holding, stating that
it was expressing no opinion on the question of whether Gasperini
would govern "if a State were to adopt a scheme that tied the award of
punitive damages more tightly to the jury's finding of compensatory
damages." 310 Accordingly, it is clear that in the two most recent decisions concerning the Reexamination Clause, 311 the Court is less protective of the right to jury and allows review of the jury verdict.
III.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT GIVETH AND THE SUPREME
COURT TAKETH AWAY

The Supreme Court Giveth - Upholding the Basic Right to jury Trial
The Seventh Amendment preserves to litigants the right to
jury trial in suits at common law-not merely suits, which the
common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable
rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were
administered .... In a just sense, the amendment then may
well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity
and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar
form which they may assume to settle legal rightsY

The jury's role as a fact-finding body has been found so important
and vital to this country's jurisprudence that any limitation of the
right to a jury trial "'should be scrutinized with the utmost care.' "313
Throughout history, the Court has safely guarded this basic right to
the "preservation" of trial by jury in cases determining "legal"
rights.314
This trend is seen quite clearly in two lines of cases. One holds that
the right extends beyond the common-law forms of action recognized
in 1791 and is applicable to new causes of action created by Congress.315 The other line of cases stands for the proposition that "ex309. Id. at 437 n.ll (citing Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 432).
310. Id. at 440 n.13.
311. See supra notes 236-311 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gasperini
and Cooper.
312. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3
Pet. 433, 447 (1830)).
313. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959) (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
314. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347-48
(1998).
315. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974) (reviewing prior Supreme
Court precedent and stating that "[w]hatever doubt may have existed
should now be dispelled. The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions
enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the
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pansion of adequate legal remedies provided by ... the Federal Rules
necessarily affects the scope of equity." 316
1.

Statutory Causes of Action

Regarding statutory causes of action, as demonstrated above, 317 the
Court has been quite liberal in finding a right to jury trial over statutorily-created claims when Congress provides for judicial enforcement
of the remedy provided. 318 In fact, in Granjinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 319 the Court extended this view, and held that a person sued
for fraudulent conveyance had a right to a jury, despite Congress' designation of these actions as "core proceedings" adjudicated in Article I
Courts. 320 Additionally, in Curtis v. Loether, 321 the Court held that a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applied to an action pursuant
to "section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 322 [which] authorizes
private plaintiffs to bring civil actions to redress violations of Title
VIII, the fair housing provisions of the Act." 323
This trend is consistent with the recent Supreme Court cases of
Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 324 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television,
Inc., 325 and City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of Monterey, Inc. 326 In
each instance, the Court analyzed various historical analogues, but focused more emphasis on the characterization of the remedy. 327 For
example, in Curtis, the Court drew the analogue that "[a] damages
action under the statute sounds basically in tort - the statute merely
defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a

316.
317.
318.

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

324.
325.
326.
327.

statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law"). ld. at 194.
Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509.
See supra Part II.A.
See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 (1989). When Congress creates law granting new "public rights," if a violation would be adjudicated by an administrative agency, a denial of jury rights will not be
deemed a violation of the Seventh Amendment. Id. However, "private
right" cases are still afforded Seventh Amendment protection. ld.
492 U.S. 33 (1989).
/d. at 36.
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
/d. at 189.
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 189. The Court further identified other examples of the
application of the Seventh Amendment to statutory causes of action. /d. at
193; see also Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (trademark laws);
Fleitman v. Welshach St. Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (antitrust laws); Hepnerv.
United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909) (immigration laws).
494 u.s. 558 (1990).
523 U.S. 340 (1998).
526 U.S. 687 (1999); see also supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.l-3. The Court did this expressly in Terry when it found
itself in "equipose" after characterization of the issues presented and decided the jury question based upon the characterization of the remedy. See
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's wrongful breach." 328
This rather broad characterization would be satisfied by numerous
statutory claims. In fact, this is the same characterization the Court
made in Del Monte Dunes when analyzing§ 1983 claims. 329 The Court
explained that such claims, independent of their specific characteristics, are sound in tort and are legal. 330
Mter characterizing the historical analogue, the issue of the right to
jury is often resolved by classification of the remedy requested. When
the remedy requested is monetary, the Court classifies the award as
"legal," although noting that they "do not go so far as to say that any
award of monetary relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief." 331 However, the only example to which the Court has referred, without deciding expressly, is the possible characterization of the remedy available
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in an action for back pay
and reinstatement as "equitable." 332
2.

Procedural Technicalities and Advancements

The second line of cases demonstrate that mere procedural technicalities, unique to the common law system and irrelevant after the
merger of law and equity, as well as the procedural advancements
made pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, will allow a
finding of a right to a jury trial. 333 For example, in Beacon Theatres v.
Westover, 334 the Court held that when legal and equitable claims are
joined in one suit, the legal claims must be resolved first by a jury, so
as to protect the party's right to jury trial over the legal issues. 335 The
rationale of the Court rested on a finding that "the justification for
equity's deciding legal issues once it obtains jurisdiction, and refusing
to dismiss a case, merely because a subsequent legal remedy becomes
available, must be re-evaluated in the light of the liberal joinder
[rules] ." 336
Justice Stewart, in dissent, chastised the majority for expanding the
right to jury in a "marked departure from long-settled principles." 337
Justice Stewart argued that the majority:
[S]weeps away these basic principles as 'precedents decided
under discarded procedures' . . . . [and] suggests that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have somehow worked an
'expansion of adequate legal remedies' so as to oust the Dis328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195.
See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 709.
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196; see also Teamsters v. terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196-97.
See infra notes 334-54 and accompanying text.
359 u.s. 500 (1959).
Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 508-09.
/d. at 509.
/d. at 517 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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trict Courts of equitable jurisdiction, as well as deprive them
of their traditional power to control their own dockets. 338
Three years later, the Court, continuing in the Beacon Theatres tradition, decided Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood. 339 This case involved breach of
contract and trademark infringement claims in which the plaintiff requested injunctive relief and an accounting to determine the amount
owed and judgment for that amount. 340 The defendant in Dairy Queen
argued that the entire action was purely equitable according to the
equitable relief sought - injunction and an accounting - or, in the
alternative, "if not purely equitable, whatever legal issues that were
raised were 'incidental' to equitable issues, and, in either case, no
right to trial by jury existed." 341 The Court disagreed and held that an
"incidental" rule may not be applied in the federal courts after Beacon
Theatres because the right to trial by jury over all legal issues may be
preserved under the liberal procedural rules. 342 The Court further
explained that:
The constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to
depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings.
The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for
an equitable accounting . . . is the absence of an adequate
remedy at law . . . . In view of the powers given to [courts
under the Federal Rules] to appoint special masters to assist
the jury in those exceptional cases where legal issues are too
complicated for the jury adequately to handle alone, the burden of such a showing is considerably increased [if not
impossible] .343
Thus, the Court found another example of "procedural changes
which remove the inadequacy of a remedy at law ... sharp [ly] diminish [ing] the scope of traditional equitable remedies by making them
unnecessary in many cases." 344
Ross v. Bernhara345 is a final example of the trend of procedural
changes resulting in an "expansion" of legal remedies and an "expansion" of the basic right to trial by jury. 346 The Court in Ross held that a
shareholder has a right to a jury on all legal issues presented in the
shareholder's derivative suit, regardless of whether such an action at
common law was purely equitable, because the shareholder was with338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

/d. at 518 (quoting the majority opinion).
369 u.s. 469 (1962).
/d. at 475.
/d. at 470.
/d. at 479 n.19 (quoting Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509).
/d. at 477-78.
/d. at 478 n.19.
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
/d. at 540.
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out standing to sue in a court of law. 347 The Court reasoned that the
derivative action "has dual aspects: first, the stockholder's right to sue
on behalf of the corporation, historically an equitable matter; second,
the claim of the corporation against directors or third parties on
which, if the corporation had sued and the claim presented legal issues, the company could demand a jury trial." 348
The shareholder's derivative suit is similar to the class action, in that
prior to the merger of law and equity they were equitable devices. 349
Due to the merger of law and equity, a class action plaintiff now has a
right to a jury on all legal issues presented, as do shareholders, because "[a]fter adoption of the rules there is no longer any procedural
obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before juries [in these instances ] .... ,350
Justice Stewart, in dissent, argued that:
Somehow the Amendment and the Rules magically interact
to do what each separately was expressly intended not to do,
namely, to enlarge the right to a jury trial in civil actions
brought in the courts of the United States .... Today the
Court tosses aside history, logic, and over 100 years of firm
precedent .... 351
Justice Stewart explained that a shareholder's suit at common law
was not viewed as a suit to enforce a corporate cause of action, but
rather "was conceived of as an equitable action to enforce the right of
a beneficiary against his trustee." 352 Unlike prior cases involving multiple claims:
[A] derivative suit has always been conceived of as a single,
unitary, equitable cause of action .... [T]here are for the
most part, no such things as inherently 'legal issues' or inherently 'equitable issues.' There are only factual issues, and
'like chameleons [they] take their color from surrounding
circumstances . ' ... If history is to be so cavalierly dismissed,
the derivative suit can, of course, be artificially broken down
into separable elements. But so then can any traditionally
equitable cause of action, and the logic of the Court's position would lead to the virtual elimination of all equity
jurisdiction. 353
Some twenty years later, the Supreme Court came close to proving
Justice Stewart correct in Terry, a case in which the Court used the
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

!d. at 532.
!d. at 538.
!d. at 542.
!d. at 541-42.
!d. at 543-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
!d. at 545.
/d. at 549-50 (quoting j. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.11 [5) (2d ed.
1969)).
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"dual nature" of an action against a Union to support finding a right
to jury trial on all legal issues presented in that case. 354

B.

The Supreme Court Taketh Away- Whittling Away at the Right to jury

Over fifty years ago, 'Justice Black lamented the 'gradual process of
judicial erosion which in one-hundred-fifty years has slowly worn away
a major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amendment."'355 About a quarter century ago Justice Marshall cried
"[t]oday, the erosion [of the Seventh Amendment guarantee] reaches
bedrock." 356 Again, some twenty years ago, Justice Rehnquist exclaimed that the majority "reduces this valued right [to jury trial],
which Blackstone praised as 'the glory of the English law,' to a mere
'neutral' factor ... [and imposes a] wholesale abrogation of jury trials."357 Moreover, only six years ago, Justice Scalia, continuing these
observations of his predecessors, stated that "this is a bad day for the
Constitution's distinctive Article III courts in general, and for the role
of the jury in those courts in particular." 358 In each instance, the
Court had deprived parties of their Constitutional right to a jury, either under the guise that the issue involved was a mere procedural
reform not essential to the right to trial by jury or by deciding that the
court had a right to review the jury's decision.
It is interesting to contrast the language of the Court when assessing
the basic right to a trial by jury versus when addressing incidents of
the right to jury or reexamination of the jury's decision. In the first
group of cases, the right to a jury trial is viewed in the highest regard:
The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic
and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence that is protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right
so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be
jealously guarded by the courts. 359
In contrast, in cases addressing incidents of the right to jury or reexamination of the jury's decision, the Court plays down the significance
of the jury, stating that "the presence or absence of a jury as fact
finder is basically neutral .... [In fact,] many procedural devices developed since 1971 ... have diminished the civil jury's historic do354. See Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); see also supra Part

II.A.l.
355. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943)
(Black, J., dissenting)).
356. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 166 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
357. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 338-39, 353 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
358. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 469 (1996) (Scalia,].,
dissenting).
359. Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942).
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main." 36 Furthermore, the Court asserted, "it is the substance of the
right to jury trial that is preseiVed, not the incidental or collateral effects of common-law practice in 1791."361
Do the mere procedural devices introduced, or the incidents of the
right to jury found not fundamental to the jury right, severely denigrate the right to jury contemplated by the Constitution? Is the characterization of an issue as legal or factual devoid of meaningful
inquiry today and, thus, no longer a basis for defining the scope of a
jury right? To determine the answers to these questions, one must
review the devices or issues that involve the right to jury that have
been held not to violate the Seventh Amendment. For example, the
modern directed verdict, 362 retrial limited to the question of damages,363 summary judgment,364 remittitur, 365 nonmutual collateral estoppel,366 and appellate review of a trial court's denial to set aside a
jury's verdict as excessive 367 have all been upheld after Seventh
Amendment challenge. Are these cases consistent with the cases preserving the basic right to jury under the common law?

1.

The Jury as Fact Finder: The Essence of the Right to Jury Trial
At issue in Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad Com-

pan/68 was the power of the trial judge to render final judgment after
a jury verdict when the specific findings of the jury were found by the
judge to be inconsistent with its general verdict. 369 The Court began
by noting, with no citation to prior precedent, that the Seventh
Amendment:
360. Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 332 n.19, 336.
361. !d. at 345 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
362. SeeGallowayv. United States, 319 U.S. 372,388-93 (1943). History and previous decisions support the notion that the Seventh Amendment was designed to protect the basic institution of the jury trial, not "the mass of
procedural forms and details." !d. at 392.
363. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931)
(declining to follow the ancient rule where a verdict erroneous as to one
issue but correct as to others must be set aside entirely).
364. See Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902) (holding that summary judgment does not deprive the defendant of the right to
a jury trial because there is no issue of fact if summary judgment is
granted).
365. See Dimick v. Scheidt, 292 U.S. 474 (1935) (upholding remittitur without
granting a new right to a jury trial).
366. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-37 (1979) (holding
that the use of defensive collateral estoppel does not violate the right to a
jury trial).
367. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436 (holding that the Seventh Amendment is not
violated by appellate review of the trial court's denial of a motion to set
aside a verdict as excessive).
368. 165 u.s. 593 (1897).
369. !d. at 596.

2002]

The Seventh Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial

263

[D]oes not attempt to regulate matters of pleading or practice, or to determine in what way issues shall be framed by
which questions of fact are to be submitted to a jury. Its aim
is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but
substance of right. This requires that questions of fact in common law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall
not assume directly or indirectly to take from the jury or to
itself such prerogative. So long as this substance of right is
preserved, the procedure by which this result shall be
reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature
370

The argument attacking the constitutionality of such a power was
based on the common law rule that the judge, while authorized to
grant a new trial, could not overturn the general verdict in favor of a
judgment consistent with the special interrogatories. 371 The Court
disagreed, reasoning that the answers to the special interrogatories
comprised the factfinding of the jury. 372 Thus, the Court found that
issuing a judgment consistent with those findings did not tread upon
the party's right to a jury trial because the party had only a right to
have the jury decide the facts. 373 A general verdict under these circumstances was an application of the law to the facts and within the
authority of the judge to decide. 374
In 1920, the Supreme Court held that use of an "auditor" to initiate
a factual investigation, examine the parties and witnesses, and file a
report to the court for the limited purpose of "simplifying the issues
for the jury," without making any final determination of the issues, did
not violate the Seventh Amendment. 375 The Court relied upon the
same rationale as in Walker- that the Constitution "does not require
that old forms of practice and procedure be retained ... [but rather
allows] the introduction of new methods for determining what facts
are actually in issue [in order to make the court] ... an efficient
instrument in the administration ofjustice." 376 The right to jury is not
obstructed so long as the jury may make its final determination of the
facts without interference. 377 Thus, despite an opinion formed by the
auditor on the facts and items in dispute that may "be treated, at most,
as prima facie evidence . . . . The parties will remain free to call, ex370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 598.
Walker, 165 U.S. at 596-98.
In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 304 (1920) (quoting Peterson v. Davison, 254
F. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1918)). The use of an auditor is similar to the use of a
special master.
376. Id. at 309-10 (citing Walker, 165 U.S. at 596).
377. Id. at 310.
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amine, and cross-examine witnesses ... [and thus] [n]o incident of
the jury trial is modified or taken away .... "378
2.

Mere Procedural Incidents

The Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. 379 case is one of the few
cases in which a "procedural" incident to the right to jury was found
unconstitutional by the Court. 380 The issue was whether a court could
overrule a jury verdict and enter judgment in the defendant's favor. 381
Justice Van Devanter reasoned that at common law, the court could
have ordered a new trial on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to
present sufficient evidence, but could not enter judgment in defendant's favor. 382 Because a new trial was viewed as qualitatively different from the entry of a judgment for the defendant, the Court found
that judgment notwithstanding the verdict was unconstitutional. 383
Twenty years later, in Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 384 a
case almost identical to Slocum, the Court "virtually" overruled Slocum. 385 The Redman court held that the Seventh Amendment is not
violated if the trial court reverses a jury verdict and enters judgment in
defendant's favor, as long as it reserves its ruling on the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict based on the asserted insufficiency of
the evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff. 386 Because the sufficiency of the evidence is deemed a matter of law for the court, the
verdict for plaintiff by the jury "was taken pending the court's rulings
on the motions and subject to those rulings." 387 This distinction was
considered significant by Justice Van Devanter (the same Justice who
authored Slocum) because reserving questions of law arising during a
trial by jury and taking verdicts subject to those rulings were well-established at common law. 388 The rationale for such authority was that
it provided a better opportunity for considered rulings and made new
trials less frequent. 389
The constitutionality of the modern directed verdict came under
attack in Galloway v. United States. 390 It was argued that at common
law, courts could withhold cases from the jury or set aside the verdict
for insufficiency of the evidence by two motions: the demurrer to the
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

/d. at 311 (emphasis in original).
228 U.S. 364 (1913).
/d. at 385.
/d. at 376.
!d. at 380.
/d. at 399. The plaintiff, at least, gets a second chance at a jury verdict.
295 U.S. 654 (1935).
/d. at 658-59.
/d.

/d. at 659.
/d. The authority to grant a new trial and direct a verdict for the "losing"
party were also well-established at common law. /d.

389. Redman, 295 U.S. at 660.
390. 319 u.s. 372, 390 (1943).
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evidence or motion for new trial. 391 The directed verdict today, however, differs from these two motions because the directed verdict involves a "higher standard[] of proof . . . and . . . different
consequences follow" the court's ruling. 392 The majority, consistent
with the rationale that the Seventh Amendment does "not bind the
federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial
according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to
the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence
then prevailing," 393 held that the modern-day directed verdict does
not offend the right to trial by jury. 394 The majority relied on the recognition that the rules of the common law were not "crystallized in a
fixed and immutable system . . . [but] were constantly changing and
developing during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. "395
The Court then cited to cases and commentary from England and
the United States, illuminating the constant development of the nonsuit and demurrer to the evidence between 1779 and 1828. 396 It is
unclear why this is even relevant, as the relevant inquiry is English law
in 1791. Moreover, the Court explained that "the passage of time has
obscured much of the procedure which then may have had more or
less definite form, even for historical purposes." 397 From these propositions the Court determined that the "logical conclusion ... is that
the Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury
trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even then so widely among common-law jurisdictions. "398
Next, the majority turned from the historical approach, because it
had determined that there was no Constitutional requirement that
the specifics be "preserved," and instead looked to functional considerations to decide the question presented. 399 This technique is similar to that recently used in Markman and Del Monte Dunes. 400 Under
the common law approach, the moving party was required to concede
the full scope of the opponent's evidence and to admit that they have
no case if the opponent's case is found legally sufficient. In other
words, if the demurrer was granted, the judge entered judgment for
the moving party, and if it was denied, the judge entered judgment for
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 391.
Galloway, 319 U.S. at 391 n.23.
Id. at 392 (citing Henry Schofield, New Trials and the Seventh Amendment, 8
ILL. L. REv. 287, 381, 465 (1913)).
398. Id.
399. See id. at 394-95.
400. See supra notes 166-70, 226-35 and accompanying text.
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the nonmoving party. 401 Today, of course, if the directed verdict is
denied or reserved, the case is presented to the jury. The majority in
Galloway reasoned that the directed verdict provides for more decisions by the jury when the motions are denied and, therefore, upheld
the directed verdict. 402 However, as the dissent pointed out, few parties brought demurrers because of their draconian nature, and as a
result, there were more cases decided by juries under the common law
approach. 403
Additionally, the majority allowed a less strict standard of review,
stating that standards:
[C]annot be framed wholesale for the great variety of situations in respect to which the question arises .... It hardly
affords help to insist upon "substantial evidence" rather than
"some evidence" or "any evidence" .... The matter is essentially one to be worked out in particular situations .... [T] he
essential requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for probative facts, after making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party
whose case is attacked. 404
The dissent took exception to this explanation because the "substantial evidence" standard "permit[s] directed verdicts even though
there [is] far more evidence in the case than a plaintiff would have
needed to withstand a demurrer." 405 Initially, federal courts allowed
the case to go to a jury unless there was "no evidence" to support the
nonmoving party's case. 406 Soon it was declared that "some evidence"
was not enough, and that "there must be evidence sufficiently persuasive to the judge so that he thinks 'a jury can properly proceed.' "407
Clearly, although these are mere terms to be applied, they set different standards, and the current rule allows for the granting of more
directed verdicts, resulting in less jury decisions. As the dissent explained: "Either the judge or the jury must decide facts, and to the
extent that [the judge] take[s] this responsibility, we lessen the jury
function. "408
Another "procedural" issue addressed by the Supreme Court arose
in Gasoline Products, Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. 409 In Gasoline Products,
the Court held that setting aside a verdict in part and ordering a re401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

Galloway, 319 U.S. at 394 n.29.
Jd.

!d. at 402-03 (Black, J., dissenting).
Jd. at 395.
Jd. at 403.
Jd. at 403-04.
Jd. at 404 (citing Schuylkill & Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81
u.s. 442, 448 (1871)).
408. Jd. at 407.
409. 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
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trial of damages alone did not violate the Seventh Amendment. 410 It
was undisputed that such a procedure was unavailable at common
law. 411 At common law, if a verdict was deemed erroneous with respect to any issue, an entire new trial was held. 412 The Court, nevertheless, found this to be merely a form of procedure that need not be
retained as it was under the common law. 413
Dimick v. Schied(n 4 was the second rare instance in which the Court
disallowed a "procedural" incident, additur, as volatile of the Seventh
Amendment. 415 The Court distinguished the accepted practice of remittitur by explaining that:
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a
remission of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible
support in the view that what remains is included in the verdict .... But where the verdict is too small, an increase by
the court is a bald addition of something which in no sense
can be said to be included in the verdict. 416
The Court found it necessary to distinguish the two procedures in
order to avoid extending doubtful precedent upholding remittitur to
the practice of additur. 417 Perhaps the Court would have fared better
if it recognized the error in its precedent allowing remittitur and
found both practices in violation of the Seventh Amendment.
Justice Stone, in his dissent, focused on the popular refrain that the
Seventh Amendment has always been construed to "preserve the essentials of the jury trial" in actions at law, but has never been construed "to perpetuate in changeless form the minutiae of trial practice
as it existed in the English courts in 1791."418 In analyzing the historical guides, Justice Stone reasoned that:
[T] he common law was something more than a miscellaneous collection of precedents. It was a system, then a growth
of some five centuries, to guide judicial decision. One of its
principles, certainly as important as any other, and that
which assured the possibility of the continuing vitality and
usefulness of the system, was its capacity for growth and development, and its adaptability to every new situation ....
. . . If this Court could thus, in conformity to common law,
substitute a new rule for an old one because it was more con410.
411.
412.
413.

/d. at 499.
See id. at 498.
/d. at 497.
/d. at 498 ("It is the Constitution which we are to interpret; and the Consti-

414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

tution is concerned, not with form, but with substance.").
293 u.s. 474 (1935).
/d. at 486.
/d. at 486.
/d. at 485.
/d. at 490 (Stone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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sonant with modern conditions, it would seem that no violence would be done to the common law by extending the
principle of the remittitur to the case where the verdict is
inadequate, although the common law had made no rule on
the subject in 1791. 419
The majority responded that although the common law is flexible:
[H] ere, we are dealing with a constitutional provision which
has in effect adopted the rules of the common law, in respect
of trial by jury, as these rules existed in 1791. To effectuate
any change in these rules is not to deal with the common
law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution. 420
Recently, the Court in Hetzel v. Prince William Countt 21 circumscribed the ability of courts to allow remittitur. 422 The Hetzel Court
held that the Seventh Amendment requires that a judge allow the
plaintiff the option of a new trial when imposing a remittitur. 423
3.

The Definition of 'Jury"

Aside from these "procedural" incidents, the actual definition of
the 'jury" has been challenged. Specifically, in Colgrove v. Battin, 424
the Court determined that reducing the size of the civil jury from
twelve to six persons did not violate the Seventh Amendment. 425 The
dissent warned that the reduction in jury size is not "some minor tinkering with the role of the civil jury, but [involves] its wholesale abolition and replacement with a different institution which functions
differently, produces different results, and was wholly unknown to the
Framers of the Seventh Amendment." 426 Nevertheless, the majority
argued that on its face, the language of the Seventh Amendment "is
not directed to jury characteristics, such as size, but rather defines the
kind of cases for which jury trial is preserved, namely 'suits at common
law.' "427 Because the state practices varied so widely as to the cases in
which civil jury trial was provided, the proponents were left resorting
to the general words "suits at common law." 428 This reasoning, however, does not explain what the Framers had in mind by the term
'jury." As the dissent argued: "To the extent that anything at all can
be inferred from the rejection of these arguments [that state practices
differed], it follows ... that the Framers intended to override state
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

/d. at 495-96.
Dimick, 293 U.S. at 487.

523 U.S. 208 (1998).
/d. at 211.
/d.

413 u.s. 149 (1973).
/d. at 160.
/d. at 166-67 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
/d. at 152 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. Amend. VII).
/d. at 153-55.
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differences as to both the cases in which a jury right would attach and
the characteristics of the jury itself." 429
Further, as there was little debate over the use of the term 'jury,"
one could argue that even when a dispute arose regarding whether a
right to jury trial attached, all parties would agree to the nature of the
jury.430
To further support its decision, the majority in Colgrove analyzed
whether the size of a jury was necessary to maintain the essence of the
right to a jury trial. 431 The Court cited numerous studies conducted
to determine the impact of six versus twelve member juries and concluded that, because there was no significant difference between verdicts of the different-sized juries, a jury of six satisfied the Seventh
Amendment. 432 The majority reasoned that the only jury requirement is to have enough people, who represent a cross-section of the
community, to engage in deliberation. 433 The dissent found an inherent problem with this analysis:
[T] he composition of the jury itself is a matter of arbitrary, a
priori definition. As Mr. Justice Harlan argued, "[t]he right
to a trial by jury . . . has no enduring meaning apart from
historical form." It is senseless then to say that a panel of six
constitutes a 'jury" without first defining what one means by
a jury, and that initial definition must, in the nature of
things, be arbitrary ....
Since some definition of 'jury" must be chosen, [we should]
rely on the fixed bounds of history which the Framers, by
drafting the Seventh Amendment, meant to "preserve." 434
As far back as 1899, Justice Gray in Capital Traction Co. v. Ho_r 35

analyzed the history of the . Seventh Amendment extensively and
explained:
"Trial by jury," in the primary and usual sense of the term at
the common law and in the American constitutions, is ... a
trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the
429. I d. at 175 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority only noted the variety of
state practices, concerning when the right to jury applied, suggesting that
the state practices were uniform regarding what comprised the jury (twelve
persons). However, the dissent pointed out that other state practices regarding " [t] he manner of summoning jurors, their qualifications, of whom
they should consist, and the course of their proceedings" vary widely. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 174 (quoting 3M. FARRAND, REcoRDS OF FEDERAL CONVENTION 101, 164 (1911)).
430. Id. at 173.
431. Id. at 157.
432. Id. at 159-60 and n.15.
433. Id. at 160 n.16.
434. Id. at 180, 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted). This raises an interesting contrast between "essentialist" versus
"constructivist" approaches to defining what a jury is.
435. 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
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superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on
the law and to advise them on the facts . . . . This proposition has been so generally admitted, and so seldom contested, that there has been little occasion for its distinct
assertion ..
The terms 'jury' and 'trial by jury' are, and for ages have
been, well known in the language of the law .... A jury for
the trial of a cause was a body of twelve men, described as
upright, well-qualified and lawful men, disinterested and impartial, not of kin nor personal dependents of either of the
parties, having their homes within the jurisdictional limits of
the court, drawn and selected by officers free from all bias in
favor or against either party, duly empanelled under the direction of a competent court, sworn to render a true verdict
according to the law and the evidence given them; who, after
hearing ... the instructions of the court relative to the law
involved in the trial, and deliberating, when necessary, apart
from all extraneous influences, must return their unanimous
verdict upon the issue submitted to them. 436
The majority approach in Colgrove is thus unusable. How does one
determine how many persons are enough? As Justice Marshall noted
in dissent, "[m] erely observing that a certain level of group representation is constitutionally required fails to tell us what that level is.
And, more significantly, it fails to tell us how to go about deciding
what that level is. "437
4.

Reexamination of the Jury's Decision

Finally, the Supreme Court's treatment of the Reexamination
Clause of the Seventh Amendment further denigrates the right to
jury. As discussed above, the Court in Gasperini held for the first time
that an appellate court could review the trial court's denial to set aside
a jury's verdict as excessive, 438 over the vigorous dissent of Justice
Scalia. 439 Also, the Court found that a trial judge could review the
findings of the jury under the standard provided by state statutes. 440
Thus, pursuant to Gasperini, a trial judge in a New York court will review the size of jury verdicts under a "deviates materially" standard. 441
436. !d. at 13-15 (citations omitted) (quoting Opinion of Justices, 41 N.H. 550,
551 (1860)). In fact, as recently as 1987,Justice Scalia referred to the jury
as "12 private citizens." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 428 (1987).
437. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 180 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
438. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996).
439. !d. at 461 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
440. Id. at 437-38.
441. !d. at 437-38. The "deviates materially" standard is significantly more strict
than a "shocks the conscience" standard used at common law. See id. at
425.
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Additionally, the Court in Cooper Industries held that the standard of
appellatereview ofajury award of punitive damages is de novo review,
not abuse of discretion. 442 The Court stated that the 'jury's award of
punitive damages does not constitute a finding of 'fact' ... [and thus]
does not implicate the Seventh Amendment .... "443
These two recent decisions are further examples of the Court's diminishing the significance of the parties' right to jury trial. In sum,
there are numerous instances when the Court denigrated the right to
jury by allowing judicial intervention that was not found at common
law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court clearly wants to have its cake and eat it too. On
the one hand, the Court eloquently speaks of the fundamental right
to trial by jury and carefully preserves that right by adherence to historical analogies with almost a predisposition to find that a right existed at common law. 444 In the next breath, however, the Court finds
that a jury need not determine particular issues as these issues are
merely incidents to the right to jury. 445 Further, the Court allows decisions to be reviewed by both the trial and appellate judges and the
results overturned, damages reduced, or a new trial granted, reducing
the integrity of the right to jury trial. 446 Moreover, there is no essence
to what constitutes a 'jury" even though certain basic attributes of the
jury were fairly well-established in the minds of the Framers. 447 The
result, as Justice Marshall said some twenty-eight years ago is "that the
common-law jury is destined to expire, not with a bang, but a whimper."448 Perhaps, we are beginning to hear the final sobs today.

442. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431
(2001).
443. /d. at 437.
444. See supra Part liLA.
445. See supra Part III.B.
446. See supra Part III.B.
447. See supra Part III.B.3.
448. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 168 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting).

